decrypted · 21 november 2026 · vulnerabilities and patching · uk policy and law · surveillance and privacy

The government's secret encryption notice to Apple is no longer secret

On Thursday the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which hears the UK's national security cases, said what the government spent almost two years refusing to say: the Home Secretary has given Apple a technical capability notice. The tribunal rejected the "neither confirm nor deny" position, holding that the government had not shown disclosure would damage national security. The secrecy is the smaller story. The bigger one is what such a notice can do to the tools UK organisations use to protect their data.

What the notice is

The power sits in section 253 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Think of a council ordering a locksmith to keep a spare key to every customer's door, in case a warrant arrives. The Record reports that Apple withdrew its strongest iCloud encryption option, Advanced Data Protection, for UK users in February 2025, a detail we could not confirm in a second source. With that option only the customer holds the keys, so the provider cannot hand over readable data. A demand to keep access collides with the design that made the data safe.

What the tribunal decided

The judgment, dated 19 November 2026, came from a panel led by Lady Carmichael. It found the policy had not been applied consistently, because officials had briefed newspapers and Apple had briefed US officials. In its words, "anyone with even a passing interest in this topic already knows" that a notice was served.

It did not decide whether the notice is lawful. Still to be argued: whether the power can reach interception outside the UK, whether it can regulate a company's security services, and whether it is proportionate. A full hearing is expected in the first half of 2027, and parts stay closed, so what Apple was told to do remains secret.

A government spokesperson told The Record that "terrorists, child abusers and organised crime groups cannot be allowed to operate beyond the reach of the law." That is a fair statement of intent, but not an answer to the engineering question.

The Secure by Design lesson

The design decision is where the keys live. If the supplier holds them, one door opens for everyone: the warrant, the criminal who breaches the supplier, the rogue insider and any foreign government with leverage. If only the customer holds them, those doors do not exist, and the only lever left is pressure on the supplier to withdraw the feature. The price is lost password recovery, harder support and a feature that can vanish for UK customers.

What a director can do this week:

Opinion, not advice: control of your data cannot be outsourced.

Also this week

A VMware zero-day, patched after two months of attacks. Google says a China-linked group it calls Armory Castle exploited a flaw in VMware vCenter, with the public reference CVE-2026-123890, for more than two months before Broadcom's patch arrived on Thursday. It scores 9.8 on CVSS, the zero-to-ten severity score, and lets an unauthenticated attacker obtain an administrator session. Google says the group got in through a separate zero-day in a remote support product, a reminder that admin tooling is an entry point. Broadcom's advisory does not mention exploitation, so read Google's account as the source for that. Fixed versions are 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0200 and 8.0 U3m; Broadcom says vCenter 7.0 customers should contact support if they have an extended support contract. Patch, then hunt for compromise.

An AI agent found a zero-day on its own. Amazon says operators working in Simplified Chinese pointed an open-source AI penetration-testing framework called Cairn at universities in East Asia, and that it found a previously unknown path traversal flaw in a medical imaging application without the operator choosing each step. Amazon, quoted by The Record, assessed "with high confidence" that it was a zero-day, and the maintainers have since fixed it. One failed run made 148 actions over 16 hours, including a Log4Shell attempt. The lesson is cost: attackers' patience is now cheap, so assume exposed software is probed all night.

A mail filtering supplier confirms an attack. N-able says hackers compromised one web server behind Mail Assure and SpamExperts Hosted Cloud, possibly reaching stored credentials. It says it found no evidence customer data was taken, and has rotated internal credentials, revoked customer API tokens (the keys one program uses to talk to another) and invalidated login tokens. If you use the service, expect to reissue integrations. The design point: a supplier's server should not hold credentials that outlive a single job.

Sources

If you want help working out where your keys and your suppliers' access really sit, get in touch.

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